According to a fashionable tradition in philosophy of action, intentional action needs sensible knowledge: somebody who acts advisedly is aware of what they’re doing whereas they are doing it) argues that AN anti-luminosity argument, of the kind developed in, may be pronto tailored to supply a refutation of an epistemological condition on intentional action. This paper undertakes a rescue mission on behalf of an epistemic condition on intentional action. we tend to formulate and defend a version of an epistemic condition that’s free from any luminance commitments. whereas this version of an epistemic condition escapes reductio, it comes with substantive commitments of its own. In particular, we are going to see that it forces North American nation to deny the existence of any primarily intentional actions. we tend to prolong to argue that this consequence ought to be embraced. On the ensuing picture, intentional action isn’t luminous. however it still entails sensible knowledge.